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Essay

Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context
in Public Forum Analysis
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.t

At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to
shape a turning point in man's unending search for freedom. So it was
at Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So
it was last week in Selma, Alabama.'
Lyndon B. Johnson
Some thirty years ago, five days in March helped to begin a new era for
the South, and for the nation. From March 21 to March 25, 1965, thousands
of civil rights protesters marched down U.S. Highway 80 from Selma to
Montgomery, Alabama, to call attention to the state's systematic
disenfranchisement of black citizens. Then as now, Highway 80 was a main
regional corridor, connecting Selma and Montgomery with points east and
west, symbolically linking Alabama's denial of the right to vote with similar
abuses throughout the South. Thus, the Selma march represents a high-water
mark for the vindication of speech rights and the democratic values they

t

Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; J.D.. LL.M.. Duke University. 1991. Law Clerk

to the Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 1991-92.
I am grateful for the suggestions of Professors Owen M. Fiss and William %V.Van Alstyne. I would also
like to acknowledge the contributions of S. Elizabeth Wilbom and John C. Hueston. who were both
instrumental in the development of this piece.
1. Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise. 1965 PUB. PAPERS 281 (Lyndon B
Johnson, Mar. 15, 1965).
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embody. In the words of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Selma, Alabama
2
became a shining moment in the conscience of man."
3
The social significance of the Selma march is well documented. By
focusing national attention on the disenfranchisement of Southern blacks, it
prompted Congress to pass one of the most sweeping civil rights laws in
history: the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 4 The Voting Rights Act, in turn, led
to a dramatic rise in black participation in democratic government, forever
altering the shape of politics throughout the South and throughout the nation.'
Yet the opinion that made the march possible, written by then District Judge
Frank M. Johnson, Jr.,6 has faded from our collective memory with time. In
7
some ways, however, Judge Johnson's opinion in Williams v. Wallace is
every bit as remarkable as the Selma march itself. On the thirtieth anniversary
of the march, it is fitting and proper to look back at the events that took place
in Selma in the spring of 1965, and to reconsider their relevance to our
present.
This Essay argues that the Selma march should be-although it plainly is
not-as well regarded for its contribution to the development of First
Amendment law as to the development of our national morality. Judge
Johnson's opinion rests on the principle that the right to protest on public
property should, at least in some circumstances, be determined in relation to
the wrongs being protested. When deciding whether to permit the four-day
march on U.S. Highway 80, Judge Johnson observed that "it seems basic to
our constitutional principles that the extent of the right to assemble,
demonstrate and march peaceably along the highways and streets in an orderly
manner should be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs that are
8
being protested and petitioned against." After examining an extensive record,
he concluded that the wrongs suffered by the black citizens of central Alabama
were "enormous." '9 The scope of the right to protest, he ruled, "should be
2. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Our God Is Marching On! (Mar. 25, 1965), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 227, 228 (James M. Washington ed., 1986)
[hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
3. One historian has observed, "In the long saga of southern blacks' efforts to win free and equal
access to the ballot, no one event meant more than the voting rights campaign in Selma, Alabama .... "
DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

or

1965, at 1(1978) [hereinafter GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA].
97

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1 3p (1988). Historians have acknowledged the causal relationship between
the Selma protests and passage of the Voting Rights Act. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE

RIGHTS 254-55
AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOtIH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL

(1993); GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 133-78.
5. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS AT: TEN YEARS AFTER 1-9, 39-52
(1975) (noting substantial increase in minority political participation and voting rates as result of Act);

VOTING EQUALITY 1-3,
BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUFST FOR

15-16,
6.
7.
8.
9.

21-23 (1992) (noting that direct barriers to electoral participation by minorities have largely fallen),
President Carter elevated Judge Johnson to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1979.
240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
Id. at 106.
Id.
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In light of the State of Alabama's longstanding

and systematic denial of basic civil rights to its black citizens, Judge Johnson
issued an injunction that permitted the plaintiffs to conduct a four-day march

over fifty-two miles on a major highway.
The proposition that the scope of the right to protest should be
commensurate with the wrongs one seeks to protest seems to cut against the

grain of contemporary "content-neutral" First Amendment analysis." This
Essay argues that it is nonetheless a valid means by which to apportion access

to public space. Under current First Amendment "forum analysis," a protest on
the scale of the Selma march almost certainly would not be allowed to proceed
on a public highway. 2 Given the immense impact of the Selma march on
American society, Judge Johnson's Williams opinion suggests that existing
public forum doctrine does not adequately protect the rights of citizens to

protest.
Yet Judge Johnson's "principle of proportionality'

3

has not received the

serious consideration that it deserves. In the three decades following Judge
Johnson's decision in Williams v. Wallace, his opinion has frequently been
cited for the proposition that local hostility to an exercise of First Amendment

rights is an insufficient basis for prohibiting the exercise of the right.'" To be
sure, Williams is a paradigmatic example of the proposition that a "heckler's
veto" cannot be permitted to silence otherwise protected expressive activity.

Most courts have not been willing to apply the broader proportionality
principle that Judge Johnson enunciated, however.' 5 And while several law

10. Id.
11. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo. 114 S. Ct. 2038. 2047 (1994) (O'Connor. J..
concumng) ("With
rare
exceptions, content discrimination in regulations of the speech of pnvate citizens on pnvate property
or in a traditional public forum is presumptively impermissible. and this presumption is a %cry strong
one.").

For an academic treatment of content neutrality and freedom of speech. see Paul B Stephan 111.
The
First Amendment and Content Discrimination.68 VA. L. REV. 203. 214-31 (1982) (reviewsing evolution
of Court's approach to content neutrality); see also Daniel A. Farber. Content Regulation and the First
Amendment: A Revisionist Vew, 68 GEO.LJ. 727 (1980) (noting and justifying Court's recent departurcs
from content neutrality); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of ItsContent: The Peculiar
Case of Subject MatterRestrictions. 46 U. CHI. L. REV,. 81 (1978) (analyzing recent cases in which Court
did not adhere to content neutrality).
12. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
13. See Frank M. Johnson, Civil Disobedience and tire Law. 44 TUL L REv I. 4 (1969)
14. See, e.g., National Socialist WThite People's Party v. Ringser. 473 F2d 1010. 1014 n.4 (4th Cir.
1973); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746. 755 (7th Cir. 1972); see also LAURE.NCE H TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrTIONAL LAW § 12-10. at 853 n.22 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Iilliams for proposition that
public hostility to speaker's point of view cannot serve as basis for limiting speaker's exercise of his free
speech rights).
15. Another district court applied the proportionality principle when determining whether a municipal
government's refusal to issue a parade permit for an anuwar demonstration was "'reasonable" in context.
See Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995. 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
The Fifth Circuit has never directly passed on the substance of Judge Johnson's Williama opinion.
In Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967). however, the court did uphold a conviction for
a civil rights violation based in part on interference with the march. The court held that the protesters had
a legal right to march, but reserved judgment as to whether that authonty stemmed from the distract
court's
order. Id at 560-61.
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review articles in the late 1960's and early 1970's criticized the proportionality
a comprehensive analysis-or a
principle in passing, none has undertaken
16
defense-of Judge Johnson's opinion.
This Essay revisits both the Selma march and the legal opinion that made
it possible. I argue that the proportionality principle recognized in Williams can
help to ensure adequate access to public space when it is most needed-a
result largely foreclosed under current First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although the specific circumstances that led Judge Johnson to embrace the
proportionality principle in 1965 are, thankfully, long gone, the problem of
ensuring that adequate public space is available to accommodate meaningful
social protest remains. Properly understood and carefully limited, the
proportionality principle can continue to help vindicate democratic values
today, just as it did thirty years ago in Selma.
I. MARCHING TO FREEDOM

Perhaps the most striking (and therefore memorable) moment of the Selma
march was its conclusion, when 25,000 people marched up Dexter Avenue to
the Alabama state capitol to demand that the state guarantee all its citizens
their civil rights.' 7 The march ended with a rally on the steps of the capitol,
at which Martin Luther King announced to the nation that segregation was "on
its deathbed."' 8 His rhetorical question "How long?" was both a call to arms
and a ringing indictment of Southern society:
I know you are asking today, "How long will it take?" I come to
say to you this afternoon however difficult the moment, however
frustrating the hour, it will not be long, because truth pressed to earth
will rise again.
How long? Not long, because no lie can live forever.
How long? Not long, because you still reap what you sow.
How long? Not long, because the arm of the moral universe is
long but it bends toward justice.
16. For criticism of the Williams decision, see Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Protest, Politicsand the
First Amendment, 44 TUL. L. REV. 439, 443-44 (1969) (characterizing proportionality test as exercise in
"interpreting existing doctrine imaginatively"); Burke Marshall, The ProtestMovement and the Law, 51 VA.
L. REV. 785, 788-89 (1965) (noting novelty of proportionality test); Elliot Zashin, Civil Rights and Civil
Disobedience: The Limits of Legalism, 52 TEX. L. REV. 285, 300-01 (1974) (noting controversial nature
of Johnson's opinion). But see BASS, supra note 4, at 252 (quoting Archibald Cox's description of Judge
Johnson's approach as "novel, but sound").
The most recent discussion of the principle appearing in a law review appears to misconstrue Judge
Johnson's opinion. See Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the FirstAmendment.
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 675-76 (1985) (arguing that under proportionality principle, Nazis would
not be permitted to march in Skokie, Illinois, because Nazis are bad people). Downs' claim that Judge
Johnson would look to the morality of the person or group seeking to exercise speech rights is plainly wide
of the mark. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
17. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTIIERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 412 (1986) [hereinafter GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS].
18. KING, supra note 2, at 228.
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How long? Not long, 'cause mine eyes have seen the glory of the
coming of the Lord, trampling out the vintage where the grapes of
wrath are stored. He has loosed the fateful lightning of his terrible
swift sword. His truth is marching on.' 9
These images, these words, remain with us because of their scope and
poignancy. The Selma-to-Montgomery march, however, was not simply the
product of inspiring leadership and the commitment of the civil rights
community to progressive change. It was also the result of thoughtful judicial
intervention. Any analysis of the march's significance must therefore include
some consideration of the federal judiciary's role in securing for the marchers
the right to protest. And in order to appreciate that role, one must first
understand the context in which the march arose, and the precise facts on
which Judge Johnson relied in reaching his Williams decision.
In King's words, "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave Negroes some part
of their rightful dignity, but without the vote it was dignity without
strength." 2 In 1965, the disenfranchisement of the black citizens of Alabama
was nearly complete. Although 15,115 black persons of voting age resided in
Dallas County, the central Alabama county of which Selma is the principal
city, only 335 (representing 2.2% of all black citizens) were registered to
vote.2' In contrast, 9542 of the 14,400 white residents of Dallas County were
registered. 2 This appalling pattern repeated itself throughout other counties
in central Alabama's "black belt.' 23 In some areas, dead white Alabama
residents apparently enjoyed greater access to the ballot than live black ones.
In Wilcox County, for example, none of the 6085 black residents were
registered to vote, but 2959 of only 2647 white residents were registered.2'
The reason for this pattern was simple: The State of Alabama maintained
a systematic program to prevent its black citizens from voting, relying on
devices such as discriminatory application of qualifying tests, discriminatory
enforcement of registration rules, poll taxes, and outright racial
gerrymandering.2 'Throughout the state ...all types of conniving methods
[were] used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters and there
[were] some counties without a single Negro registered to vote despite the fact
that the Negro constitute[d] a majority of the population. ' 6 By 1965, this
at230.
19. Id.
20. Id. at227.
21. Williams v.Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 104. 112 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
22. Id.
23. In Perry County, 365 of 5202 black residents were registered to vote. compared with 3260 of the
3441 white residents. Id. at 114. In Hale County, 218 of 5999 black residents and 3395 of 3594 white
residents were registered. Id. at 116. In Choctaw County, 284 of 3982 black residents and 4886 of 5192
white residents were registered. Id at 118.
24. Id. at 115
25. See BASS, supra note 4, at 146-48, 152-53; GARROW,BEARING THiE CROSS. supra note 17. at

380-81; see also KING, supra note 2,at228.
26. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra note 2, at 289, 299.
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state of affairs had become intolerable to the black citizens of Alabama. The
time for change had come.
The horrors of Birmingham in 1963, when Police Commissioner Bull
Connor used dogs and firehoses to terrorize protesters who were engaging in
a peaceful protest seeking basic civil rights, played no small part in the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 King and his colleagues believed
a similar mass demonstration would be necessary to secure the voting rights
of Southern blacks. In late December 1964, leaders of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC), including King, decided that it was time to
implement a new phase of the "Alabama Project," a series of demonstrations
designed to wrest the right to vote from reactionary Southern state
governments. 8 On New Year's Day in 1965, Jim Bevel of the SCLC met
with the Dallas County Voters League to discuss renewed efforts to roll back
Jim Crow.

29

Selma's sheriff, Jim Clark, enjoyed a statewide reputation for "vicious and
violent behavior" toward civil rights protesters. The organizers of the
Alabama Project chose Selma as the focal point of the voting rights campaign
because the volatile Sheriff Clark was likely to react badly to their demands
for suffrage. 3I They hoped that publicity generated by the SCLC's nonviolent
protests would arouse the conscience of the nation and lead to federal
legislation securing the right of all citizens to vote without regard to race.
King and his staff held an organizational meeting on January 2, 1965, at
the Brown Chapel A.M.E. church.32 At the meeting, King set forth the goals
of the Alabama Project, and emphasized his determination to force the nation
to take action to end the disenfranchisement of black citizens.33 King returned
to Selma on January 14 for a second organizational rally.? At this meeting,

27. Following the most notorious incident, which took place on May 3, 1963, the national media
carried pictures of dogs attacking young children and firehoses literally blowing the clothes off their bodies.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 249-50. These images left President John F. Kennedy
"sick." Id. at 250; see also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT at xvii-xx (1985) (noting causal relationship

between events in Birmingham, Alabama, and introduction of civil rights legislation). In the late spring of
1963, with President Kennedy's approval, the Justice Department drafted comprehensive legislation that
would provide for the desegregation of all public accommodations. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra
note 17, at 267-69. Ultimately, Congress approved the legislation, and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
it on July 2, 1964. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra, at 227-29. For a comprehensive history of the Birmingham
civil rights protests in the spring of 1963, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS 1954-63, at 673-802 (1988).
28. CHARLES E. FAGER, SELMA, 1965, at 8-10 (2d ed. 1985); GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra
note 17, at 369-72.
29. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 371.
30. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 3 (1978); see also FAGER, supra note 28, at 5.
31. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 3-4, 42-43.
32. See id. at 39-40.
33. See FAGER, supra note 28, at 9-10; GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 39.
34. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 42.
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he outlined the SCLC's plan for escalating the confrontation with the state
authorities, and urged the local citizens to support the coming mass actions.3"
In January and February, the black citizens of Selma repeatedly marched
on the county courthouse, demanding the right to register to vote. 6 Sheriff
Clark responded with mass arrests, beatings, and forced marches." The
protests reached a climax on Sunday, March 7. On that day, about 650
protesters left the Brown Chapel, intent on marching from Selma to
Montgomery to demand a redress of their grievances from the state
government. 38 Proceeding in an orderly and peaceful manner through Selma,
the marchers crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge and continued to march east
on U.S. Highway 80 towards Montgomery. Sheriff Clark and Colonel Al
Lingo, head of the Alabama Highway patrol, met the marchers with around 70
state troopers, a detachment of Dallas County deputy sheriffs, and a group of
neo-vigilante "possemen" nominally under the control of Sheriff Clark. 39
Major John Cloud of the State Highway Patrol ordered the marchers to
disperse within two minutes. After only a single minute expired, however, the
"lawmen" moved against the protesters.' Using tactics "similar to those
recommended for use by the United States Army to quell armed rioters in
occupied countries," the state troopers attacked the marchers with clubs, tear
More than six dozen people were
gas, nausea gas, and canisters of smoke."
42
seriously.
some
injured in the melee,
The public's response to the events of March 7 was "little less than
'
As had happened after the Birmingham protests in 1963, the
seismic."43
brutality of the Alabama authorities provoked national and international
revulsion. The SCLC immediately began a national campaign to draw attention
to the events in Selma, issuing a public call urging leaders of the civil rights
community to come to Selma for a second attempt to march from Selma to
Montgomery.' King wrote that "[n]o American is without responsibility" for
the events in Selma and that "[c]lergy of all faiths" should come to Selma to
make their voices heard.45 Thousands responded to this call to action.46 The
second march was to take place on Tuesday, March 9, 1965.
35. Id
36. See GARROW. BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17. at 370-92; GARROW. PROTEST AT SELMA.

supra note 3,at 42-67.
37. See lAGER, supra note 28, at 26-40, 49-56. 66-71: GARROW. PROTEST AT SELMtA. supra note 3.

at 42-73.
38. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100. 104 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also GARROW. PROTEST AT
SELMA, supra note 3, at 73-77.
39. See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 104-05; GARROW. BEARING TIE CROSS. supra note 17. at 397-98.
see also FAGER, supra note 28. at 150.
40. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105; GARROw. BEARING THE CROSS. supra note 17, at 398
41. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105.
42. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17. at 399.
43. FAGER, supra note 28, at 99; see GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS. supra note 17. at 399-400.
44. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS. supra note 17. at 399.

45. Id. at 400.
46. Id. at 400, 412; GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3. at 85-46.
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In light of the March 7 attack at the bridge, the leaders of the protest
movement decided to seek federal court protection for the planned march.4 7
The protest organizers filed a class-action lawsuit on March 8, 1965, in the
federal district court for the Middle District of Alabama, on which Frank M.
Johnson, Jr. served as Chief Judge, seeking an order permitting a peaceful
protest march from Selma to Montgomery. 48 Hosea Williams, a young SCLC
activist from Savannah, Georgia, who had proved his ability by organizing
demonstrations in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1963, served as the lead
plaintiff. 49 The protest organizers hoped to obtain an immediate injunction
from the court on an ex parte basis allowing them to proceed with the march.
The court, however, rejected this request.5 Instead, Judge Johnson entered a
temporary restraining order that barred the plaintiffs from marching until the
court could conduct a full hearing on the merits of their complaint.5 1 The
hearing was scheduled for March 11.
Prior to the hearing, another confrontation took place. Because of the high
visibility of the events of March 7, King was under intense pressure to proceed
with the march, notwithstanding the district court's restraining order.5 2 On the
night of Monday, March 8, King wrestled with the question of whether to
violate the restraining order by going forward with the march. 53 Late that
evening, he apparently decided that the march would proceed. On the
following morning, March 9, civil rights activists gathered at the Brown
Chapel for a mass rally. 4
Following the rally, King led a procession of civil rights demonstrators
through downtown Selma toward the Edmund Pettus Bridge. Before the
marchers crossed the bridge, U.S. Marshal H. Stanley Fountain halted them
and read Judge Johnson's restraining order, but made no attempt to stop the
march from proceeding.55 King then led the marchers across the bridge.

47. FAGER, supra note 28, at 101.
48. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 102 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
49. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 317-37, 678 n.2.
50. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 103. The Supreme Court later cited Judge Johnson's example as an
appropriate refusal to provide relief on an ex parte basis. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S.
175, 184 n.11 (1968).
51. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 103.
52. Many of the organizers from the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) argued,
apparently quite fervently, that King should disregard the order. On the other hand, many of King's legal
advisers counseled against such action. See Bernard G. Segal, The Lawyer and Civil Rights, Remarks at
the Third Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 8, 1966), in 42 F.R.D. 442, 450-51 (1966); see also FAGER,
supra note 28, at 101-03; GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 401-03.
53. David Garrow has suggested that King reached an agreement not to march beyond the Edmund
Pettus Bridge through the intervention of former Florida Governor Leroy Collins. See GARROW, BEARING
THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 402-03; GARROW, PROTFST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 84-86. Certainly,
the apparent lack of detailed logistical preparations for a 54-mile march suggests that King did not intend
to go forward, but rather was concerned with maintaining control over his followers.
54. FAGER, supra note 28, at 102-03; GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 403.
55. FAGER, supra note 28, at 103-04; FRANK SIKORA, THE JUDGE: THE LIFE & OPINIONS OF
ALABAMA'S FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. 191 (1992).
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On the eastern side of the bridge, they were met by Sheriff Clark, his
deputies, and Alabama state troopers. Once again, Major Cloud ordered the

crowd to disperse.5 6 He and the other law enforcement officers then
withdrew, leaving the road open to King.57 Their accommodating stance was

reportedly the result of direct orders from Governor Wallace. 58 Wallace may
have hoped to place King in a Catch-22. If King led the marchers down
Highway 80 toward Montgomery, he would violate the court's restraining
order, exposing himself and the other SCLC leaders to contempt charges. On
the other hand, if King failed to proceed with the march, his credibility within
the movement might be damaged.
King did not proceed with the march. Instead, he turned around and led

the would-be marchers back across the bridge to the Brown Chapel. 9 The
reasons for King's decision to turn back are not entirely clear. It is perhaps
best understood as an example of his overall commitment to the rule of law,

at least insofar as particular laws were "just.' " One of King's advisors,
Bernard Segal, later commented that if King had "suit[ed] his deed to his

word" by violating the order, "his act would be no different in principle from
the defiance of Governor Wallace and Governor Barnett."'
Hearings on the Williams lawsuit began two days later.62 They lasted over
four days, and established a conclusive record of systematic state-sponsored

brutality against black citizens designed to deny them the vote.63 Judge
Johnson found that Sheriff Clark and his deputies had engaged in a pattern of
behavior that included mass arrests without just cause, forced marches, and the
56. FAGER, supra note 28, at 104.
57. Id.; GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS. supra note 17. at 403-04.
58. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA. supra note 3, at 87

59. See BASS, supra note 4, at 239-42; FAGER. supra note 28. at 104-05.
60. See KING, supra note 26, at 293. King defined a "just law" as "a code that a majonty compels a
minority to follow that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal." Id- at 294 Convcrsely,
an "unjust law" is "a code that a majority inflicts on a minority that is not binding on itself for that is]
inflicted upon a minority which that minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did not have
the unhampered right to vote." Id. Although King questioned the basic fairness of the order restraining the
march, he apparently never intended to defy the court. See BASS. supra note 4. at 238-39: GARROW.
PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 84. Plainly. King was not prepared to challenge the law without a
stronger showing that it was unjust.
Significantly, as defined by King, an "unjust" law will usually. if not always, be inconsistent with the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore not
law at all. See Katzenbach, supra note 16. at 444-45; Marshall. supra note 16. at 794-800.
61. Segal, supra note 52, at 450-51. At the time of the march. Segal was an attorney for the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
62. For a historical perspective on the court proceedings, see BASS. supra note 4. at 24 1-49; GARROW.
BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 406-l1; GARROW. PROTEST AT SELMA. supra note 3. at 95-9663. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 104 (M.D. Ala. 1965). Judge Johnson explained that:
The evidence in this case reflects that, particularly as to Selma. Dallas County. Alabama. an
almost continuous pattern of conduct has existed on the part of defendant Sheriff Clark. his
deputies, and his auxiliary deputies known as "possemen" of harassment. intimidation, coercion.
threatening conduct, and, sometimes, brutal mistreatment toward these plaintiffs and other
members of their class who were engaged in their demonstrations for the purpose of
encouraging Negroes to attempt to register to vote and to protest discnminatory voter
registration practices in Alabama.
Id.; see also GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMtA. supra note 3. at 99. 102. 108 (descnbing progress of heanngs)
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use of cattle prods and night sticks on peaceful marchers. 64 The court also
found that Sheriff Clark had been assisted by Colonel Al Lingo, the head of
the Alabama state troopers. The state troopers' contributions to Sheriff Clark's
efforts included beating protesters, and in at least one instance, shooting and
killing a protester. 5
The court held that the State of Alabama had undertaken a program of
intimidation aimed at "preventing and discouraging Negro citizens from
exercising their rights of citizenship, particularly the right to register to vote
and the right to demonstrate peaceably for the purpose of protesting
discriminatory practices in this area. '' 66 The court further observed:

The attempted march alongside U.S. Highway 80 from Selma,
Alabama, to Montgomery, Alabama, on March 7, 1965, involved
nothing more than a peaceful effort on the part of Negro citizens to
exercise a classic constitutional right; that is, the right to assemble
peaceably and to petition one's government for the redress of
grievances.67
Based on the facts before it, the court reasoned that the protesters had a right
to march. The question that it had to decide was the scope of the remedy.
II. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

Judge Johnson's opinion in Williams is notable for its restraint. He
approached the legal questions presented in Williams dispassionately, and his
opinion demonstrates a careful and systematic adaptation and application of
law to the facts presented to the court. To be sure, the task before the court
was not an easy one. Even if the black citizens of Selma had a right to engage
in peaceful protest, it was not clear that this right was so broad as to
encompass a fifty-two-mile march along the main east-west corridor in central
Alabama over four consecutive days.6"
64. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 104.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 105.
67. Id.
68. Judge Johnson's law clerk at the time observed that the judge knew that contemporary case law
favored denial of the march, if only because of its proposed scope and the state's "duty to maintain the
safety and commerce on those highways." BASS, supra note 4, at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Throughout his tenure on the bench, however, Judge Johnson has never been one to shrink from deciding
hard cases in ways that might prove controversial. See, e.g., Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d
824 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that state-sponsored prayer before high school football game violated
Establishment Clause); Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that constitutional
right of privacy encompasses homosexual acts between consenting adults in their home), rev'd, 478 U.S.
186 (1986); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (holding that dismissal of high school
teacher for assigning particular short story violated her right to academic freedom under First Amendment);
Lewis v. Greyhound Corp., 199 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (desegregating interstate and intrastate
motor carriers and bus terminals); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 176 F. Supp. 776 (M.D. Ala. 1959)
(desegregating Montgomery, Alabama, public parks).
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Judge Johnson began his analysis of the plaintiffs' request with a few
simple observations. He noted that "[t]he law is clear that the right to petition
one's government for the redress of grievances may be exercised in large
groups."69 Conversely, however, he recognized that government officials
"have the duty and responsibility of keeping [the] streets and highways open
and available for their regular uses., 70 As a result, he held that governments
may place "reasonable" restrictions on speech activities "in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public streets and
highways.'
These principles clearly conflict to some degree. The use of a public street
for protest activities will obviously impinge on the ability of motorists and
other pedestrians to use the same street at the same time for travel. Judge
Johnson noted that such conflicts existed in this case, but explained that "there
is room in our system of government for both, once the proper balance
between them is drawn. 72 The court had "the duty and responsibility ...of
drawing the 'constitutional boundary line.' 73 The trick, of course, was to
draw the proper line.
In striking the balance, Judge Johnson could have viewed the proposed
activity without regard to the specific context in which it arose. Considered out
of its context, Williams would not have been a difficult case. Heavily
trafficked highways exist principally to facilitate travel and commerce, not
speech activities. As a general matter, protesters cannot routinely be permitted
to march down such highways for four days at a stretch. Hence if the court
had attempted to make a universal pronouncement on the availability of
highways for speech activities, it almost certainly could not have permitted the
Selma march.
Current First Amendment doctrine supports this conclusion. Under the
existing analytical framework, a major highway would undoubtedly be
classified as a "nonpublic forum," in which speech rights are severely limited.
In a nonpublic forum, the government may impose any regulations it wants so
long as they are reasonable and not intended to suppress the expression of a
particular point of view. 74 By contrast, in traditional public forums-places
like parks and city streets, which "by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate" 75-the government may impose only
reasonable and content-neutral restrictions as to time, place, or manner of
speech. Content-based restrictions may be applied to traditional public forums

69. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 106.
70.
71.
72.
73.

1&
Id.
Id. (quoting Kelly v. Page. 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964)).
Id.

74. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 & n.7 (1983)
75. Id. at 45.
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only if the regulation directly advances a compelling state interest, is narrowly
'7 6
drawn, and leaves open "ample alternative channels of communication."
Thus, if a court today were to confront a situation like the Selma march,
it would almost certainly deny the plaintiffs the requested relief on the grounds
that state restrictions on protest activities on public highways are reasonable.
Although such plaintiffs would be able to protest in other spaces, they
probably could not receive legal sanction for a protest on the scale the Selma
marchers intended." The impact of this mode of analysis is significant. It is
doubtful that the Selma march would be long remembered had it taken place
on a single day on a side street or seldom-used park in Selma.
The Williams court, however, did not ignore the context of the plaintiffs'
proposed speech activity.78 Instead, it considered the context in which the suit
arose essential to determining whether the requested relief was appropriate.
Judge Johnson explained:
[T]he extent of a group's constitutional right to protest peaceably and
petition one's government for redress of grievances must be, if our
American Constitution is to be a flexible and "living" document,
found and held to be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs
being protested and petitioned against. This is particularly true when
the usual, basic and constitutionally-provided means of protesting in
our American way-voting-have been deprived.79

Applying the foregoing test to the facts of the case, the court concluded that
"plaintiffs' proposed plan of march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, for
its intended purposes, is clearly a reasonable exercise of a right guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States." 80
Essentially, the court began its analysis with a recognition of a
constitutional floor, a minimum of inconvenience that the First and Fourteenth
76. Id. A similar standard applies to so-called "designated" public forums, although the government
may limit the categories of speech permissible in such areas. See id. at 46 & n.7; Crowder v. Housing
Auth.. 990 F.2d 586, 590-91 (1lth Cir. 1993).
77. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1990) (plurality opinion); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984); Perry,460 U.S. at 45-49.
78. Judge Johnson's failure to employ public forum analysis did not indicate a lack of familiarity with
the applicable law. From the 1930's through the 1960's, the Supreme Court relied on a rebuttable
presumption that public property could be used for speech-related activities. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee
for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). Under the First Amendment, public property presumptively
was available for speech activities, unless under particular circumstances the government established
content-neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of the property. See, e.g., Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding. without undertaking forum analysis, that First Amendment
protected protest activity in public library). It was not until the 1970's that the Supreme Court began
engaging in formal "public forum" analyses. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
547, 552-58 (1975) (undertaking forum analysis to determine scope of First Amendment rights in public
auditorium). Thus Williams might be understood in part as a reflection of the state of First Amendment
jurisprudence in the mid-1960's.
79. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 108 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
80. Id. at 109.

1995]

Celebrating Selma

1423

Amendments require the general public to countenance. It did not stop there,

however. Instead, the court recognized that the constitutional floor does not
necessarily define the limits of what is permissible expressive activity. This
allowed the court to ask two questions: what is constitutionally required, and
what is constitutionally permitted.
In approving the marchers' plan and enjoining the state from interfering,
the court observed:
[T]he plan as proposed and as allowed reaches, under the particular
circumstances

of this case, to the outer limits of what

is

constitutionally allowed. However, the wrongs and injustices inflicted
upon these plaintiffs and the members of their class (part of which
have been herein documented) have clearly exceeded-and continue
to exceed-the outer limits of what is constitutionally permissible."'
The court sanctioned a march large enough to disrupt the lives of thousands

of people trying to go about their daily business. Protests on this scale, and in
this type of venue, are an anomaly; other persons or groups could not routinely
obtain official sanction for demonstrations on a similar scale. Hence the court
provided the Williams plaintiffs with expanded speech and assembly rights that
other individuals probably would not have received.
Several commentators have criticized Williams for this result, arguing that
the decision appears to give greater speech rights to certain groups on the basis
of an individual judge's sympathies for the policy preferences of particular
speakers.8 2 The danger of allowing judges to apportion speech rights based
on their individual assessments of the value of particular types of speech is

suggested by Justice Scalia in his partial dissent in the recent case of Madsen
83
v. Women's Health Center.
In Madsen, the Court upheld a thirty-six-foot

"buffer zone" around abortion clinics that had been the target of numerous
81. Id. at 108. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs' planned use of U.S. Highway 80 was not per se
unlawful. Alabama state law clearly permitted pedestrians to walk along highways. Id. at 107 & n.5.
Moreover, the court did not authorize the marchers to take over the highway incident tothe march. On the
contrary, the plan proposed by the marchers and approved by the court specifically limited the number of
marchers permitted along the two-lane stretch of Highway 80, and included detailed plans for providing
logistical support for the march. Id. at 107-08.
It is also important to realize that much of the disruption that ultimately occurred was not inherent
in the plan for the march but was rather a result of local hostility so intense that the protesters had to be
protected by a phalanx of armed national guardsmen. See Marshall. supra note 16. at 788 (noung that
march "necessitated the closing of half the highway, cost the taxpayers over $500,000 in the pay of
National Guardsmen alone, caused innumerable traffic jams, and again exposed to world opinion the
magnitude of the discrimination in the United States against Negro citizens").
82. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 16, at 676 ("Johnson's 'commensurity theorem' is not legitimate
because it incorporates the ends and substance of the speech.") (citation omitted): Zashm. rupra note 16.
at 300-01 (describing Judge Johnson's holding in Williams as "a slender reed on which to base the larger
question of the socially tolerable amounts of disruption" caused by speech activities on public property);
cf Kingsley R. Browne, Yltle
VII as Censorship: Hosnle Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHio ST. LJ. 481, 536 & n.336 (1991) (arguing that First Amendment rcquires "official
agnosticism on questions of social policy").
83. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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disruptive abortion protests. Within the zone, protesters were prohibited from
engaging in any speech activities-even in traditional public forums like public
streets and sidewalks. Justice Scalia suggested that the Court would not have
sustained a similar restriction if the object of the protest had been racial
equality, instead of the protection of unborn fetuses. He accused the
majority of protecting speech rights subjectively. 85 Justice Scalia's concern
about the selective protection of speech rights is not particularly farfetched.
Any doctrine that openly vests the judiciary with the power to favor one
speaker over another deserves to be greeted with healthy skepticism.
Even those who argue that courts should take context into consideration
when deciding the scope of First Amendment protections balk at the prospect
of giving particular speakers enhanced First Amendment rights based on the
content of their message.8 6 Professor Blasi has suggested that context is
essential to applying the First Amendment properly, but in his model of the
First Amendment, all boats rise and fall with the same tide.87 He argues that
courts should carefully consider historical context and contemporary attitudes
toward dissent when determining the scope of the First Amendment's
protection of social protest and speech activities. Hence, in periods when the
public's tolerance of dissent is low (such as during the Red Scare years), the
courts' efforts and determination to protect speech rights should be higher than
in more stable periods.88 But he expressly disavows any interest in having
courts lift some of the boats, some of the time. 89
The visceral aversion to context-specific applications of the First
Amendment is somewhat puzzling. Contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence makes a number of fine distinctions based solely on the content
of the speech at issue. 90 Perhaps the objection stems not from the idea of
considering context, but rather from the belief that speech rights should not be
apportioned on the basis of the speaker's identity.
If this is the case, much of the criticism that commentators have leveled
at Williams has been wide of the mark. Williams neither stands for nor
supports the proposition that courts should bestow preferential speech rights
on some individuals or groups based on the court's perception of the "justice"
of the individual's or group's cause. 91 In Williams, the court rested its holding
84. Id. at 2534-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. NAACP v. Claibornc
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (providing broad First Amendment protection to civil rights protesters
engaged in economic boycott of local merchants).
85. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541-50.
86. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 449, 449-52 (1985). Professor Blasi did not consider the implications that Williams might have for
his theory.
87. Id. at 452-59, 512-14.
88. Id. at 456-59, 462-69.
89. Id. at 451, 484. Indeed, he describes such an approach as "antithetical to my thesis." Id. at 451.
90. See sources cited supra note 11.
91. In fact, Judge Johnson was highly skeptical that public protests would bring about meaningful
reform. See Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civil Disobedience and the Law, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 267, 267-68
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on an analysis of the particular wrongs that the protest would call to the
attention of the state, the nation, and the world.92 In deciding whether the
state's restrictions were "reasonable," the court paid primary attention to the
issue of government culpability for the unlawful acts that the plaintiffs wished
to protest.93 Hence Judge Johnson keyed his analysis to the nature of the
wrongs being protested, not the identity of the protesters. The court did not
sanction the parceling of speech rights based on the perceived merit of
particular speakers, but rather on the importance of particular speech.
II.

THE RIGHT TO A PREFERRED

PUBLIC

FORUM

Even so, Judge Johnson's Williams opinion is open to criticism. Perhaps
the most powerful argument against the proportionality principle is that it
threatens to move the courts a step closer to the creation of a First Amendment
with two distinct classes: the preferential forum haves and the preferential
forum have-nots. If one believes that absolute equality of access to public
forums is necessary to avoid marginalizing unpopular groups, it is
inappropriate for courts to afford some groups preferred access to nonpublic
forums, even when they wish to protest a serious legal wrong. One might
reasonably argue that the result in Williams was well and good, but that
vesting judges with the power to favor some groups over others in the
allocation of public space for speech activities is at best misguided and at
worst quite dangerous. Although this criticism of Williams is not easily
overcome, it can be answered.
Simply put, it is necessary to provide some groups with greater speech
rights than others in certain situations if we are to secure the full benefits of
the First Amendment. To be sure, this proposition fits uncomfortably into our
current jurisprudence. If one starts from the proposition that the First
Amendment is designed to protect speech by persons holding minority views,
then vesting the federal courts with the power to pick and choose among

(1968); see also TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RiGirrs IN ALABAMA

122-24 (1981).
92. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F Supp. 100. 108-09 (M.D. Ala. 1965).

93. Id. at 106-09.
94. See id. at 106, 108. To be sure, some of the language in Wllians focuses on the "wrongs and

injustices inflicted upon [the] plaintiffs." 240 F. Supp. at 108. Other parts of the opinion, however, make
it clear that the court's holding rests on the legal wrongs established by the record evidence, not on a more
generalized sense of justice or morality. See id. at 104-05. 109. Although Judge Johnson has described a

judge's role as one of "remov[ing] injustice," see Frank M. Johnson. Jr.. Civilization. Integnrt. and Justice.
Some Observations on the Function of the Judicia,.43 Sw. U L. REv. 645. 647 (1989). he has also said
that a judge possesses only the limited tools provided by the law for accomplishing this task. see Frank N1
Johnson, In Defense of Judicial Activism. 28 EMORY L.J. 901. 909 (1979) ("lilt is one thing for a judge
to adopt a theory of public morality because it is his own; it is another for him to exercise his judgment

about what the public morality implied by the Constitution is."). Thus. a judge is bound in the first instance
by law, but can inform the application of particular laws with the broader policy choices reflcted in the

Constitution.
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speakers seems inappropriate.95 If one properly limits the scope of the
proportionality principle, however, the danger of creating a speech caste system
can be significantly reduced, if not entirely avoided.
A. Values and Public Policies Underlying the FirstAmendment
Whether one embraces the proportionality principle will turn at least in
part on how one views the raison d'9tre of the First Amendment's free speech
and assembly guarantees. If these clauses are meant to foster democratic selfgovernance though the maintenance of a lively and robust public
debate96-- one

that includes

in

particular

discussion

of government

wrongdoing-it is entirely appropriate (and indeed necessary) to afford groups
suffering legal wrongs at the hand of the government greater access to public
forums than groups wishing to protest other matters.
The free speech and assembly guarantees of the First Amendment provide
political minority groups an outlet to express their concerns over government
conduct. They help to ensure that these groups can obtain a hearing by the
general community. Moreover, the ability to engage in social protest on the
public streets may reduce the likelihood that groups will undertake other, less
savory measures to attract the community's attention. 7 The First Amendment
95. Cf.Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when
a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result,
or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think
that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.
Id. at 630. Would federal judges permit speakers whose overall purpose is "fraught with death" to enjoy
heightened access to preferred public forums on the same basis as groups whose aims seem to be less
odious? A modicum of faith in the judiciary is certainly required if the proportionality principle is to be
implemented. Indeed, our current First Amendment jurisprudence already presupposes a basic faith in the
professionalism of federal judges. See WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 39-47 (1984).
96. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND rTs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

22-27 (1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH]; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUIrONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 20-28 (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner,
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1992).
97. See, e.g., Charles L. Black Jr., The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with
American Institutionsof Government, 43 TEX. L. REV. 492, 505 (1965) ("A radical catharsis through drastic
civil disobedience may be the only alternative in some places to solutions infinitely more dreadful."). The
desire for publicity is a significant motivation for many acts of terrorism. Blowing up the World Trade
Center gets the world to pay attention to a political cause, albeit in a destructive, negative way. See Graham
Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and Other Casualties, 31
WM. & MARY L. REV. 773, 779-82, 819-21 (1990). See generally Sheldon L. Leader, Free Speech and
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thus provides disenfranchised subgroups within the community with a peaceful
means of agitating for change.
Relatedly, the community can benefit from having its conscience pricked.
Without speech activities by affected groups, unlawful government conduct
might go unnoticed by the general public.98 The exercise of free speech rights
can call problems to the attention of the majority, permitting them to make
necessary corrections through the democratic process, rather than through the
courts.

The Selma march is a perfect example of speech activities facilitating
democratic reform. Six months after the march, Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 99 which had a "spectacular" impact on minority political
participation.' ° Within two months of its passage, the number of black
voters in counties subject to Justice Department monitoring programs more
than doubled, and within a decade black voters would increase their numbers
from 1.5 million to 3.5 million.' The number of black officeholders
increased correspondingly: "By 1990, more than 4,000 blacks held elective
office in the South, including a governor, five members of Congress, and more
than 175 legislators, compared with less than 100 black elected officials in the
region before passage of the Voting Rights Act."'' 2
The march facilitated democratic reform in two ways. First, it alerted the
immediate community to the concerns of the black citizens of Alabama,
serving as a classic petition for a redress of grievances. In this way, it provided
the white citizens of both Dallas County and the entire state of Alabama with
the opportunity to initiate reform without the intervention of federal authorities.
Although the white citizens of Alabama failed to respond to this historic
demand for the observance of basic constitutional rights, the march
nevertheless facilitated a process that could have resulted in a local resolution
of the crisis. In other circumstances, one can imagine local citizens demanding
reform in response to speech activity.
Second, the Selma march created tremendous pressure at the level of the
national government for the enfranchisement of all citizens. The sad truth is
that, more than a decade after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education,"3 segregation was still a pervasive feature of Southern culture

the Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law and Political Theory. 82 COLU.t, L REv. 412, 418-20. 428-29

(1982).
98. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 160-65. 170 (1982) (Brennan. J..
disscntng); Garnson v
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1988).
100.
101.
102.
POLITICS
103.

BASS, supra note 4. at 255.
Id. On the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act, see also sources cited supra note 5
BASS, supra note 4, at 255; see also HAROLD W. STANLEY. VOTER MOBILIZATION AND THE
OF RACE: THE SOUTH AND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 1952-1984. at94-99 (1987).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in 1965. Indeed, some have argued that Brown was never fully
implemented.'' 4 Brown and its progeny provide a striking example of the
potential shortcomings of judicial relief. When one compares the present-day
results of the Voting Rights Act to the results of Brown, it is obvious that
legislative reform is often not only faster than judicial reform, but also may be
much more effective.'05 Thus, it may be logical for those suffering
systematic deprivations of legal rights to engage in mass public protest
campaigns seeking legislative relief.
The public forum doctrine, however, has created a barrier to the public
spaces needed for effective protest activity directed against existing legal
wrongs. The contemporary approach to free speech issues leads courts to adopt
unduly narrow definitions of public forums. Once a particular location is
declared a public forum, it is open season for all comers. Understandably,
courts are reluctant to open up new public spaces for speech activities. 1"
Instead, courts define public forums narrowly in order to ensure that public
spaces are available for their principal uses, and speech activities are, if not
entirely prohibited, severely restricted.' 7 This approach leaves groups
wishing to protest particularly egregious wrongs with insufficient public space
to make their protest heard. 10 8
It is doubtful that courts will reverse course and expand the public spaces
that must be made available for speech activities. Given the constant danger
104. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergetnce Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REv. 518, 518-19 (1980) (arguing that Brown is "irrelevant" to most black children). But see
Drew S. Days III, The Other Desegregation Story: Eradicatingthe Dual School System in Hillsborough
County, Florida,61 FORDHAM L. REv. 33, 37 (1992) (arguing that Brown was a relative success).
105. Almost 10 years after the Brown decision, less than 2% of Southern schools had been
desegregated. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 758 (1975). Conversely, 10 years after passage of the
Voting Rights Act, black voter registration equaled, and in some cases exceeded, that of white voters. See
GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 3, at 179-211; STANLEY, supra note 102, at 94-99.
106. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706, 2711-15
(1992) (holding that airports are not public forums); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-30,
732-37 (1990) (holding that sidewalk and parking lots on post office property were not public forums).
107. For examples of cases in which courts have found areas used by the public to be nonpublic
forums, see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-73 (1988) (public primary and
secondary school buildings); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-39 (1976) (streets and sidewalks on
military base); Multimedia Publishing Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 158 (4th
Cir. 1993) (airport terminals); Crowder v. Housing Auth., 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11 th Cir. 1993) (auditoriums
in public housing development); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F2d 1242, 1260-62 (3d Cir. 1992)
(public libraries); United States v. LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (6th Cir. 1992) (grassy median strip
between road and military base); Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1203-04 (11th
Cir. 1991) (interstate rest areas); United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 885 (11th Cir. 1991) (unenclosed
plaza outside federal office building); Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 161-62 (2d
Cir. 1990) (subway stations); Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d
1344, 1345-47 (11 th Cir. 1989) (public university property). Perhaps the best example of this trend are the
"boxes" that appear in obscure locations in major airports. Although the federal courts were unwilling to
banish speech activities from public airports completely, they marginalized speech activities in airports in
order to ensure that the primary mission of such facilities would not be compromised. See generally Fiss,
supra note 96, at 3, 8-9.
108. See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-24, at 995-97; Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political
Activity on PrivateLands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 690-91 (1991); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Of Meetings
and Mailboxes: The FirstAmendment and Exclusive Representationin Public Sector Labor Relations, 72
VA. L. REv. 91, 112-15 (1986).
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of undue disruption of community activities, the judicial trend of limiting
access to public forums cannot be avoided in a First Amendment jurisprudence
that makes no accommodations for context. Unless courts can pick and choose
among speakers on the basis of the wrongs they seek to protest, the balancing
of the public's need to use public roads and buildings against the use of such
facilities for speech activities will invariably cut against the speech activities.
Current doctrine forces courts to ask whether groups like the Ku Klux Klan
should routinely be permitted to use a particular public space for speech
activities. All too often, the answer is "no," not only for small minorities
holding extremist views, but also, by operation of the content-neutrality
doctrine, for those who wish to call the attention of the community to serious
government wrongdoing.
The proportionality principle permits courts to make rational distinctions
between proposed uses of public forums for speech activities. Rather than
prohibiting all groups from parading on a community's main arteries, the
proportionality principle permits most groups to be relegated to less busy
corridors, but holds out the possibility of using major highways and byways
under sufficiently compelling circumstances." ° 9 The proportionality principle
permits courts to match venues for speech activities with the speaker's need
to speak and the community's need to hear. It thus maximizes the "public
debate" function of the First Amendment. u0
By restriking the balance in favor of speech activities under limited
circumstances, the proportionality principle ensures that groups with serious
grievances can make their case to the community effectively. If a minority
group's protest is invariably relegated to the forums most convenient to the
general public, the community at large will not be in a position to hear the
group's grievances. The content-neutral approach to apportioning public space
for speech activity denies disenfranchised groups adequate forums, just as it
denies the general community the right to hear such groups' grievances. If
provided with an effective outlet to vent their frustration, such groups are

109. Former Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach has explained that "'in the spirt of the first
amendment, the government has an especially high duty to preserve, and even to welcome, dissent when

it is government policy which is under attack." Katzenbach. supra note 16. at 450-51 The proportionality
principle simply incorporates this idea.
110. Following the Rodney King verdict in May 1992. a group of University of Washington students
marched down Interstate 5 in downtown Seattle to protest both theLos Angeles police department's
treatment of Rodney King and the jury's subsequent verdict. The organizer of the march explained that
"[wie want[ed] to be peaceful, but at the same time. we wantledl to be heard." Students Say Their
Peace-UW Senior Maintains Calm in 1-5March toDowntown. SEArLE TImES. May 2. 1992. at AS. The
protest caused tremendous disruption to motorists on the highway. and was patently unlawful, since most
limited-access highways are closed to pedestrian traffic. See. e.g.. WASAH. ADMIN. CODE § 468-58-050(1)
A similar protest occurred in San Diego, where a group of angry citizens marched down Interstate 5. See
Tony Perry, Keeping Lid On in San Diego, L.A. TIMES. Apr. 2. 1993. at A3. These demonstrations were
certainly preferable as a means of social protest to thenots that erupted in Los Angeles and other U.S.
cities. Under the proportionality principle, however, protesters might have legal access to highways and
similar forums in these circumstances. See generally Fiss, supra note 96. at 3-1I. 18-20
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presumably less likely to resort to civil disobedience or criminal acts in order
to bring their causes to the attention of the community.
Moreover, to the extent that democratic self-governance both presupposes
and requires the existence of an active, informed electorate,"' the
proportionality principle helps to ensure that the community is fully informed
about instances of government wrongdoing, and thereby empowered to act. The
proportionality principle makes it easier for the community to listen when a
speaker has a legitimate complaint about the government that the community
itself has installed. If a sheriff's department is routinely beating minority
suspects, the community should tolerate inconvenience in order to
accommodate speech activities calling this state of affairs to the body politic's
attention. If speech activities are limited to side streets, parks, and other
traditional public forums, it is less likely that a group's message will be heard.
And if the message is not heard, the problem may never be resolved
12
peaceably.'
Essentially, the public forum doctrine lacks needed depth, because it fails
to take context into account when apportioning public space for speech
activity." 3 Although the particular facts and history of the Selma march are
unique, one can imagine other situations in which a state government denies
or abridges a constitutional right, even though the degree and scale of
deprivation pales in comparison to the police state tactics used in the South.
In such circumstances, the federal courts should weigh the nature of the
alleged constitutional deprivation when considering whether to permit the use
of normally unavailable public property for speech activity protesting the
deprivation.
Consider the case of Proposition 187, the referendum measure recently
approved by California voters, which would severely curtail provision of basic
state services, such as education and health care, to illegal immigrants.
Opponents of this measure have argued that it is inconsistent with binding
Supreme Court precedent."' Under normal circumstances, the political
S11.See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 96, at 22-27, 88-89.
112. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257;
see also discussion supra note I10. Whether a mass protest in downtown Los Angeles could have averted
the rioting in the South Central neighborhood is open to question. Nevertheless, the absence of an effective
forum for expressing the rage and alienation caused by both the police department's treatment of Mr. King
and the subsequent verdict was certainly a contributing factor to the community's choice of rioting as a
means of expressing its disapproval of the police officers' behavior and the verdict.
113. Professor William Van Alstyne has suggested that the First Amendment's protection of speech
activities can be described as a series of concentric circles, each farther away from a "core" of political
speech. See VAN ALSTYNF, supra note 95, at 41. This conceptualization of the First Amendment
demonstrates one shortcoming of existing doctrine: The model is two-dimensional rather than threedimensional, and thus lacks the depth that consideration of context would provide.
114. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that Texas statute that withheld from local
school districts funds for education of children not legally admitted into U.S. violated Equal Protection
Clause), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982); see also Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Judge
Blocks Most Sections of Prop. 187, L.A. lIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al (reporting court issuance of stay of
enforcement of Proposition 187).
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process would offer critics of this measure a forum to voice their opposition.

This route is not available to the people most affected by Proposition 187,
however. Illegal immigrants-in California, largely Mexicans-cannot
vote." 5 Because of their covert status, they face great (and perhaps even
insurmountable) difficulties in lobbying effectively against this measure. Of
course, there are many other people who are likely to be sympathetic to their
claim, including Mexican-Americans, who are legal, taxpaying resident aliens
but who also cannot vote under California law." 6 Suppose, however, that
because of their difficulties in obtaining access to the political process, these
immigrants and their supporters wish to hold a demonstration to protest the
state's enactment of an unconstitutional policy. In this case, the existence of
a legal wrong, coupled with the lack of alternative means of obtaining relief,
justify providing expanded access to public property for speech activities
protesting the referendum.
Contrast this claim with that of a political candidate, the nominee of a
major party, who thinks that the colors blue and white look good together, and
plans to use them in his campaign materials. Consequently, he does not wish
his opponent to use the same colors." 7 After being denied copyright and
trademark protection, he wishes to engage in speech activities to protest the
government's failure to issue a copyright or trademark for the colors blue and
white.
Under existing First Amendment jurisprudence, a candidate's speech about
his desire to copyright the colors blue and white for his campaign materials is
protected no more, and no less, than a protest of a denial of constitutional
rights by persons who do not have access to the ballot. Both cases fall within
the category of "political speech," and therefore government restrictions on the
speech would be analyzed identically in both cases. The illegal immigrants,
however, have suffered a much greater wrong than a person who has been
denied a copyright for his campaign colors. Similarly, the public's need to
know about denial of constitutional rights is of a higher order than its need to
know about the intellectual property dispute.
Contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence has no way of
distinguishing between the two claims. When attempting to obtain access to a
public forum for the purpose of engaging in speech activity, Proposition 187
opponents are limited in their selection of a public forum by the community's
interest in avoiding undue inconvenience to the same degree as the political
candidate's supporters. The degree of protection afforded the speech activities

115. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (restricting right to vote to U.S. cttizens).

116. Id.
117. This hypothetical is not as farfetched as it might initially seem. If one posits an electorate with
a low literacy rate and a career politician/candidate who traditionally uses blue and white in hiscampaign

materials, it is entirely plausible that a rival candidate mtght try to create voter confusion by using
promotional materials with the same color scheme.
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is content-neutral; within a given class of speech, all speakers are treated
equally well (or equally shabbily).
The proportionality principle adds needed depth to the forum analysis, by
permitting a court to look at the merit of the speech claim, albeit in a limited
way. The court's task is not to determine whether speech within a particular
category is good or bad for the community, but rather to determine whether the
speech seeks to call attention to a legal wrong committed at the hands of the
government." 8 Under Williams, the strength of a speaker's claim of a First
Amendment right to use a particular public forum is a function not only of the
category of speech at issue, but also of whether the speech seeks to call
attention to government misbehavior."'
Returning to the hypothetical, the Proposition 187 opponents have a claim
that implicates a serious government wrong-namely, an unconstitutional
denial of government services. 20 In such circumstances, speech activities
aimed at calling the government's misconduct to the attention of the
community should be accorded preferential public forums; the community
should be required to tolerate more than nominal inconvenience in order to
provide illegal immigrants, resident aliens, and their citizen-supporters with an
effective public forum. Of course, whether they should have the right to march
up Interstate 5 from San Diego to Los Angeles would depend on the precise
facts of the case. 2 ' Nonetheless, the proportionality principle would allow
some groups greater access to public forums on a principled basis, helping to
ensure maximum utility of the First Amendment as an effective means of
promoting good governance.
B. Subjectivity and the ProportionalityPrinciple
The most serious criticism of the proportionality principle is that it is too
subjective. It would allow federal judges to bestow preferential venues for
118. See Villiams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 107-09 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
119. Of course, it is theoretically possible to permit courts to evaluate the relative importance of
various categories of speech, including speech that does not implicate government wrongdoing. Current
First Amendment jurisprudence divides speech into a number of such categories: political, religious,
commercial, erotic or pornographic, and obscene. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991)
(finding nude dancing to be within outer periphery of First Amendment); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (finding commercial speech protected by First
Amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-30 (1973) (finding obscenity unprotected by First
Amendment).
That said, I cannot endorse a wholesale abandonment of content neutrality. Even well-intentioned
judges are apt to favor those groups with which they agree, and undervalue claims by groups they despise.
See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990) (refusing to
sanction sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-67
(1878) (condemning Mormon practice of polygamy as "odious").
120. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-88 (1983). But see Burdick v. Takushi, 112
S. Ct. 2059, 2063-64 (1992) (finding that if ballot access restrictions are reasonable and nondiscriminatory,
"the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions").
121. See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 109 ("Mhe exercise of such rights in each instance must be
determined according to the facts and circumstances presented.").
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speech activities on their favored ideological groups. Judges who oppose
abortion will hand over Interstate 95 in Richmond to Operation Rescue while
environmentally minded judges permit Greenpeace to occupy the Port of
Seattle. Even if the proportionality principle can be justified theoretically,
difficulties remain regarding the details of its practical application. These
practical difficulties, however, are far from insurmountable.
As Judge Johnson made clear in Williams, the application of the
proportionality principle is not contingent on whether a given judge fancies
particular speech, but rather on whether the proposed speech activity has at its
core the purpose of calling public attention to a legal wrong, a statutory or
constitutional violation committed by the government. 'n The wrongs at issue
in Williams were not just moral wrongs, but also clear legal wrongs, stemming
from a deprivation of basic constitutional rights.
Not every moral wrong also constitutes a legal wrong, much less a
constitutional violation. Under Williams, only a group wishing to protest a
legal wrong could qualify for heightened access to public forums for speech
activities. 123 Likewise, most speech activities aimed at producing legislative
reforms would not qualify for expanded access to public forums.' 4- Such
speech activities would, most assuredly, qualify for protection against arbitrary
government suppression; like any political speech activities, the protests would
merely be subject to content-neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.'2' Although such speech would be constitutionally protected, it
would not qualify for rights approaching "the outer limits of what is
'
constitutionally allowed. '""s
This limiting principle is a necessary
manifestation of the rule of law. For better or worse, courts are limited to
providing relief for legal wrongs, not moral ones.
The inverse of this principle, however, is that a legal wrong constitutes a
basis for judicial relief.127 Professor Owen Fiss and others have suggested
that the federal courts should possess broad authority to provide a complete
remedy for constitutional wrongs, even when such a remedy requires the court
to interpose itself in the operation of a state agency.' 2 On the basis of this
theory, Fiss has defended the district courts' use of "structural injunctions," in

122. See id. at 108.
123. For example, a protest of the atrocities taking place in Bosnia would certainly call attention to
the moral wrongs occurring there, but probably does not implicate a constitutional interest.
124. For example, however desirable a 38-hour work week might be. there is no constitutional or
statutory right to it. Thus, a group wishing to build popular support for legislation mandating a 38-hour
work week would gain no special purchase on the public streets by operation of the proportionality
principle.
125. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. 1846. 1850-51 (1992).
126. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 108.
127. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.. 489 U.S. 189. 194-98 (1989);
Barry Friedman, Right and Remedy, 43 VAND. L. REv. 593. 610-11 (1990).
128. See, e.g., OwEN FtSS. THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9-12.36-37. 94-95 (1978); Oe.n ,M.Fiss.

The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justce. 93 HARV. L- REV. I. 27-28 (1979); see
also John Minor Wisdom, Rethinking Injunctions. 89 YALE L. 825. 828-31. 833 (1980).
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which federal courts assume responsibility for the operation of a state agency
(e.g., a state prison or mental hospital). Courts only have authority to provide
this type of relief, however, when a plaintiff can establish the existence of a
constitutional violation:
[A] past wrong is required for the issuance of the structural
injunction; the mere threat of a wrong in the future is not likely to be
deemed sufficient to trigger the reform enterprise .... A structural
injunction is unlikely to issue without a judgment that the existing
institutional arrangement is illegal, is now a wrong, and will continue
to be wrongful unless corrected. 2 9
Courts possess broad authority to remake institutions, but they possess this
authority only if a legal wrong has been identified. "[D]epartures from the
standard models of judicial behavior are ultimately justified and determined by
underlying substantive rights."'"3
Thus, the requirement that invocation of the proportionality principle be
linked to a legal wrong stems not from the First Amendment, but rather from
the institutional limitations applicable to the exercise of judicial power. If one
thinks of the proportionality principle as a kind of extraordinary injunctive
relief, then its application must be limited to situations in which a legal wrong
is present. Courts simply do not have the authority to order any relief for
moral, social, or philosophical wrongs, much less extraordinary relief-relief
"at the outer limits of what is constitutionally permissible."''
Moreover, the only legal wrongs that can be allowed to "count" for
purposes of applying the proportionality principle are legal wrongs suffered at
the hands of the government. Even if one concedes that the proportionality
principle's application can logically be limited to legal wrongs, one reasonably
could question why those wishing to protest legal wrongs should be afforded
special access to public forums only if the government commits the legal
wrong. The answer is quite simple: Legal wrongs suffered at the hands 32of the
government implicate the community that constituted the government.
If one accepts that the principle of popular sovereignty is fundamental to
democracy, the government serves as an agent of the people. 33 Popularly
elected officials, like governors and sheriffs, are accountable to the citizens

129. Fiss, supra note 128, at 11.
130. Id. at 94.
131. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
132. It is possible to establish a rough hierarchy of legal wrongs. In general, courts should assume that
a constitutional violation entails a higher order of wrong than a violation of a statute or administrative rule,
because of the higher procedural standards necessary for adoption of a constitutional provision. See U.S.
CONST. art. V.
133. This principle is inherent in the Preamble to the Constitution, which locates power in "We the
People." U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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who elected them.' 34 So too are city councils, library boards, and police

departments. Public entities and officers exercise authority derived from the
community, ostensibly for the benefit of the community that selected them. If
an agent of the community violates the legal rights of an individual or group
within the community, the community at large shares responsibility for that

action. So it is that when a Bull Connor turns loose his dogs on innocent
children, or a Jim Clark instructs his men to beat peaceful protesters with billy
clubs, or a Daryl Gates permits his officers to terrorize persons suspected of
committing crimes, culpability lies in part with the people who delegated that
power to them.
When an agent of the people commits a wrong, the aggrieved person can
go to court and seek redress on the merits of the claim. That may not be

enough to resolve the problem fully, however. The injured person also may
wish to call the community's attention to the wrong, in hopes that the
community might take action to resolve the problem without judicial
intervention. In such circumstances, the public's right not to be inconvenienced
is significantly less weighty than in circumstances where the proposed speech
activity does not implicate wrongdoing by the government. A group that has
suffered a legal wrong at the hands of a government institution has a greater

claim on the community's collective ear than, say, a person wishing to protest
the use of rabbits in medical experiments. The community's responsibility for
the actions of its government requires that the balance between the right to use
the streets for speech activities and the right to use the streets for travel be
struck in favor of the speech activities more often and to a greater degree when

government wrongdoing is at issue. 35 By delegating power to an official
who systematically violates the community's laws, the community has in some
measure forfeited the right to avoid the inconvenience occasioned by speech
activities on the public streets protesting such action."
134. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 404-05 (1819) (noting that
government is agent of the people); HENRY S. COMMAGER. MAJORITY RULE AND MINORrrY RIGirs 4-5
(1958) (discussing principle that "men make government" as fundamental to Amencan politics); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-78 (1980) (arguing that Framers of Constitution viewed ballot
as means of combating tendency of power to separate rulers from ruled).
135. First Amendment law already makes special accommodations for persons wishing to speak about
the existence of government wrongdoing. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378. 384-87 (1987): Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Perry v. Sinderman. 408 U.S. 593. 598 (1972); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-73 (1968). Thus, a government employee who speaks out about a matter of
"public concern" is generally protected from retaliation by her government employer. Moreover. application
of Pickering and its progeny requires courts to balance the public employer's interest in "promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs" against the "[employees'] opportunities to contribute to public
debate." Id. at 573. At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized that the general public has a
constitutionally protected interest in receiving information, even information of a (mere!) commercial
nature. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
& n.15, 761-70 (1976). Williams simply applies this same value in the context of weighing the availability
of a particular public forum for speech activities.
136. Former Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach has endorsed thts approach in relatively
strong terms:
My point is that if the objective of government is-as it should be--to maintain confidence in
its processes, it may often have to go well beyond what is consutuuonallv reQUIred to Drove I1%
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Williams can be viewed as an instance in which the community, through
its governor, sheriff, and voting registrars, permitted the systematic violation
of fundamental constitutional rights. In such circumstances, it was (and is)
entirely appropriate to require the community to be inconvenienced by persons
wishing to call the community's attention to its abrogation of responsibility for
the actions of its elected officials. Viewed in this light, whether a speech
restriction is "reasonable" will turn as much on the content of the speech as
on the venue for the speech activity.'37
Indeed, some legal wrongs committed by the government reflect a failure
of executive and legislative officials to act in the face of clear legal
obligations. 38 In such circumstances, the federal judiciary may have to act
creatively in order to provide meaningful relief. In the context of social protest,
"[t]his is particularly true when the usual, basic, and constitutionally provided
13 9
means of protesting in our American way-voting-have been deprived."'
Thus, to the extent that the legal wrongs offered to support the invocation of
the proportionality principle include an assertion that the aggrieved group has
been effectively denied access to the political process by the state, the group
has established a sufficient condition for the application of the proportionality
principle."'

The proportionality principle does not sanction subjective decisions by
judges based on ideological factors, but rather calls upon judges to consider the
relationship of the proposed speech activity to the community in which the
speech activity will occur when analyzing claims to a particular public
forum. 4 ' To the extent that the speech is the direct result of actions
point. In the spirit of Judge Johnson's decision with respect to the Selma-Montgomery march,
it may have to go to extremes of inconvenience to prove its fundamental dedication to free
political processes. Where the government itself is the object of criticism, the obligation to
tolerate dissent, to make available suitable public forums, and to refrain from even the
appearance of repression is particularly important.
Katzenbach, supra note 16, at 449.
137. See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 106-09; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384-88; Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 568-69, 572.
138. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977) (ordering judicially supervised reform of prisons following failure
of state authorities to undertake meaningful reform); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 & 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (ordering judicially
supervised reform of state-operated mental institutions following failure of state authorities to undertake
meaningful reform).
139. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 108.
140. This is not to say that such exclusion is a necessary condition for the application of the principle.
Rather, when a group has been denied access to the political process, the need for an alternative means of
registering dissent is particularly acute. Thus, if individuals or groups seeking enhanced access to public
property for speech activities can establish the existence of a legal wrong, the proportionality principle
should potentially apply, even if the individual or group has not been completely excluded from the
political process.
141. It should not matter whether the speaker is the actual person or group that has suffered the
wrongs; it is the existence of the wrong that is critical. Not permitting third parties to claim the benefit of
the proportionality principle would effectively preclude some wrongs from being called to the community's
attention through mass protest. For example, the prevailing conditions in a state's prisons or mental
hospitals might be unconstitutional; obviously the persons suffering the wrongs--the prisoners and mental
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implicitly sanctioned by the community through the democratic process, the
court must correspondingly discount the community's interest in reserving the
forum for its normal, everyday uses. Considered in this light, Williams requires
judges to do little more than determine whether the proposed speech activity
involves a protest of unlawful conditions brought about by the state.
Of course, not every claim of government wrongdoing can give rise to
mass protests that significantly disrupt the everyday life of the community. Not
every group wishing to protest a legal wrong caused by the government may
be permitted to qualify for a preferred venue for its speech activities. Courts
must evaluate the strength of such requests on an individual basis, granting
requests for expanded access to public spaces in some cases and rejecting them
in others. But this process is really no different than the balancing of equities
that courts routinely conduct in evaluating requests for preliminary
injunctions. 4 2 Like the preliminary injunction analysis, the proportionality
principle requires the development of a rational limiting principle that permits
courts to sift competing claims to public space.
The Williams court painstakingly documented the existence of grievous
legal wrongs committed by agents of the state government.1a3 The court
granted enhanced speech rights to the plaintiffs only after the plaintiffs had
established that the wrongs that they sought to protest were colorable claims
raising serious constitutional issues.'" Courts should undertake application
of the proportionality principle only after a similarly rigorous analysis.
C. The Problem of Judicial Discretion
Even if the proportionality principle is thus limited, its exercise raises
potential problems concerning the application of judicial discretion. The
decision to grant Group A, but not Group B, access to a particular forum
requires an exercise of discretion. And for Group B to be told that it cannot
patients-would not be able to protest the wrongs themselves, although they might have other legal
recourses. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh. 438 U.S. 781 (1978); lwl. 503 F.2d at 1305. However. a third
party (e.g., a family support group for prisoners) should be permitted to engage in speech activities calling
the unconstitutional conditions to the community's attention, and in determining an appropriate venue for
such activities, the gravity of the wrongs suffered by the prisoners or mental patients should be considered.
See generally United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty. 445 U.S. 388. 403-07 (1980) (permitting third
party to assert legal rights of another); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106. 117-18 (1976) (same). Thus. "the
spokesman need not.., be the victim.... An individual member of the victim group can be a spokesman.
but there is no reason why individual membership should be required, or for that matter even preferred"
Fiss, supra note 128, at 19.
142. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531. 546 n.12 (1987); Thomburgh v
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747. 817-18 (1986) (O'Connor. J.
dissenting); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390. 392 (1981). In addition to establishing the
probability of success on the merits, in order to qualify for a preliminary injunction, a petitioner must also
show: (I) irreparable harm. (2) that the respondent will not suffer undue harm if the injunction issues, and
(3) that issuance of the injunction would not be inconsistent with the public interest. See. e.g., Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 817-18.
143. Williams, 240 F.Supp. at 103-05.
144. Id. at 108-09.
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use the same public space that Group A can use will, to Group B, seem
arbitrary indeed.
No easy answer exists to this criticism. Clearly, implementation of the
some groups will perceive themselves
proportionality principle will mean that
45
to have been unfairly disadvantaged.
There are at least two partial responses, however. First, the proportionality
principle deals only with the constitutional ceiling, not the constitutional floor.
Thus, every individual or group will have access to traditional or designated
public forums. Incorporation of the principle will not leave any individual or
group without significant access to public space in which to engage in speech
activities. At worst, some people may not enjoy access to the particular forum
that they wish to use.
Second, existing First Amendment jurisprudence already makes a number
of fine distinctions based on a judge's characterization of particular speech. For
example, depending on its context, a court could characterize nude dancing as
mere "conduct" or alternatively as "expressive activity.'' 4 6 The degree of
protection afforded the communicative element of the activity will depend
almost entirely upon which characterization the court chooses. Similarly,
deciding how to characterize the nature of the speech requires the exercise of
discretion. 147 Whether speech is "political," "commercial," "erotic," or
"obscene" will turn, to some degree, on the sensibilities and professionalism
of individual jurists. 148 Such decisions are essentially no different in character
from the exercise of the discretion the proportionality principle would require.
If anything, the existing distinctions are potentially more troublesome, because
they may well determine whether the expressive activity at issue enjoys any
49
protection.

145. For better or worse, constitutional law cannot entirely cabin judicial discretion. See Lawrence C.
George, King Solomon's Judgment: Expressing Principlesof Discretion and Feedback in Legal Rules and
Reasoning, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1549, 1559-66, 1573-75 (1979); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A
Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1524, 1538-39 (1991). Rather than reject a doctrine that requires
the exercise of judgment in its application, we should attempt to find reasonable ways of limiting the scope
of the discretion.
146. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 565-68 (1991).
147. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 95, at 47-49.
148. Perhaps the best proof of this is Justice Potter Stewart's famous "I know it when I see it"
comment on the problem of identifying obscenity:
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative implication in the
Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it. and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see also BOB
WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 192-204 (1979)

(describing "movie days" at Supreme Court).
149. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753-65 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-30
(1973).
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When applying the proportionality principle, judges will have to use their
discretion to fit particular forums to particular wrongs.'" The task is one of
"fashioning relief to fit the case."' 5' Although this exercise creates the
possibility of unfairness in individual cases, the benefits of providing adequate
public forums for speech activity aimed at official government wrongdoing
more than offset this opportunity cost.
If application of the proportionality principle is limited to protests
involving colorable allegations of serious legal wrongdoing by a government
official or agency, it is difficult to see how it could serve as a vehicle for
permitting judges to implement their arbitrary or narrow ideological policy
preferences. Williams certainly does not invite such behavior, nor is it
necessary to construe the proportionality principle so as to provide cover for
such unscrupulous conduct. In sum, the proportionality principle is not, and
need not be, hopelessly subjective.

IV. CONCLUSION

Judge Johnson's theory that the right to protest should, in limited
circumstances, be commensurate with the legal wrongs being protested is both
justifiable and necessary. The body politic should be constitutionally required
to make adequate public space available for protest activities by an individual
or group if the individual or group intends to protest legal wrongdoing by the
government. The strict rule of content neutrality currently in vogue-which the
federal courts observe when apportioning access to public forumsundoubtedly deprives some speakers of adequate public space in which to
make their voices heard. The proportionality principle provides a needed
remedy for the limited situations in which a protest of official wrongdoing in
a generally available public forum is simply insufficient to achieve the
manifold policies embodied by the First Amendment.
Although Williams may be novel as a matter of First Amendment law, it
is not novel in a more fundamental sense. The civil rights activists in Selma
had a right to vote, and they also had a right to protest the state's denial of
that right. The question was not the existence of the right, but the proper

150. In this regard, Williams is an easy case. Because the government's wrongdoing was so blatant
and pervasive, and given the fundamental nature of the rights involved, the court's decision to permit a
march on a massive scale was reasonable. Obviously. more difficult cases may arise. Such cases would
necessarily require courts to engage in delicate balancing acts.
151. Johnson. In Defense ofJudicialActivism. supra note 94. at 910. Courts have undertaken this task

in a number of disparate areas, notably including reform of prisons. see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nam. Newman v. Alabama. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). mental institutions.
see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 & 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). aff'd in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). and primary and secondary public education, see
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 (1990); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.. 790 S W.2d 186. 209-15

(Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491. 496-98 (Tex. 1991).
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remedy for the violation of it. And in fashioning a remedy, Judge Johnson took
into account the totality of the circumstances and determined that extraordinary
wrongs called for extraordinary remedies.
Thirty years after the great march, it is clear that Judge Johnson decided
Williams correctly, with respect to both the means and the ultimate result.
Despite the academy's failure to recognize the power of Judge Johnson's
constitutional logic, the proportionality principle is essential to ensuring that
courts will be able to afford a full measure of relief52to individuals or groups
wishing to protest official government wrongdoing.
On the thirtieth anniversary of the Selma march and the Williams decision,
it is appropriate once again to give Judge Johnson the last word:
From the moment I issued the order permitting that march, I had been
certain that I had done what was right according to the laws of this
nation. As I watched those people-and some were mere children-I
was absolutely convinced I had been right. I had never watched a
march or demonstration before, but there was something special about
the Selma-to-Montgomery march. I think the people demonstrated
something about democracy: that it can never be taken for granted;
they also showed that there is a way in this system to gain human
rights. They had followed the channel prescribed within the
framework of the law ....

[C]omplaints can be addressed within the

system, according to the
5 3 Constitution, and can be addressed without
resorting to violence.1

152. See Johnson, In Defense of JudicialActivism, supra note 94, at 910-12; see also George, supra
note 145, at 1573-75.
153. SIKORA, supra note 55, at 231-33.

